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 The use of terrain masking techniques to deny detection by surface based 
sensors, especially radar, has a long and arguably very colorful history. First 
practiced systematically during the Second World War period, terrain masking 
relies mostly upon the denial of direct line of sight between the aircraft and the 
surface based observer, or sensor. The technique was exploited intensively during 
the Cold War period, with a number of combat aircraft designs optimized for this 
penetration regime, with specific design optimizations in aerodynamics, 
propulsion and avionics. Specific types include the F-105 and F-111, and the later 
Panavia MRCA/Tornado and B-1 (Flight Manual, 1970; 1972). 
  
 The advent of modern cruise missiles, such as the AGM-86, BGM-109 
and Soviet Kh-55, saw the same penetration regime adopted. As these air vehicles 
have radar cross section values in applicable radio frequency bands of one to three 
orders of magnitude smaller than conventional aircraft, low altitude flight, and 
where feasible terrain masking, significantly improved the survivability of these 
autonomous weapons (Kopp, 2005-2012; 2009-2012, Riedel et al., 2010). 
  
 While denial of direct line of sight is the dominant mechanism in terrain 
masking, exploiting both the curvature of the earth and frequently elevated terrain 
features in close proximity to the observer or sensor, it is not the only mechanism 
of relevance. Radar processing limitations and the physics of low altitude radar 
propagation can also produce pronounced effects. 
  
 Prior to the advent of modern pulse Doppler and Air Moving Target 
Indicator (AMTI) techniques in radar, targets which were below the line of sight 
between the radar and the horizon would be obscured by terrain backscatter and 
termed clutter, making them difficult, if not impossible, to clearly resolve. Target 
acquisition and tracking performance in such geometries depend strongly upon 
the specific design of the radar system in question, encompassing antenna, signal 
processing and tracking algorithm design and integration. Introductory treatments 
of this problem are presented by Lynch and Kopp, and Stimson (Lynch & Kopp, 
2008, Stimson, 1998). 
  
 Even where a radar is capable of rejecting clutter, constructive and 
destructive interference effects arising between directly incident target 
backscatter, and target backscatter reflected by terrain, will produce what amount 
to blind elevation angles, with strong dependencies upon the shaping of the terrain 
and its electrical properties in proximity to the specular point for backscatter 
reflected from the terrain surface. In practical terms, this will produce periodic 
and frequently intensive fading effects, in which the magnitude of the target 
backscatter fluctuates very strongly, presenting severe difficulties in tracking. The 
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seminal works in this area were produced by Blake, with additional treatment by 
Murrow (Blake, 1969, Murrow, 1990). 
  
 While the special cases of a smooth surface and homogenous surface 
electrical properties, for specular and diffuse surfaces, have been well studied, 
complex surfaces with locally elevated components and inhomogeneous electrical 
properties are not analytically tractable, and present good opportunities for 
numerical modeling. 
  
 Numerical modeling techniques present other opportunities in this area of 
study, especially where Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be 
integrated with other simulation algorithms. The availability of GIS terrain 
elevation datasets of high accuracy significantly simplifies numerical modeling of 
many problems in this area. 
  
 This paper explores the effectiveness of terrain masking techniques in low 
altitude flight, where a GIS is actively exploited to select an optimal flight-path 
for concealment of an air vehicle, with a cruise missile chosen as a case study. 
Algorithms for optimal routing of this kind have previously been explored by 
Pelosi et al, and Petitt (Pelosi et al, 2012, Pettit, 2004). 
  
 The imperative for this research is the advent of specialized air defense 
systems developed specifically to engage Precision Guided Munitions in their 
"endgame" terminal trajectories, employing either missiles, guns or both, with 
radar, thermal imaging or other closed loop tracking systems. Systems in this 
category are intended to defeat anti-radiation missiles, guided bombs, and cruise 
missiles, and are often labeled “Counter PGM Systems” (Kopp, 2009-2012; 2009-
2012). 
  
 These designs typically employ X-band or Ku-band engagement radars, 
cued by a S-band or C-band acquisition radar, with a thermal imaging adjunct 
tracker, the latter sometimes supplemented by a laser rangefinder. Specific design 
aims typically include the ability to react quickly, and then direct fire at multiple 
concurrent targets, using cueing and tracking data derived from an acquisition 
radar on the vehicle itself, or external to the vehicle. Typical battery deployments 
are four vehicles, with a fifth acquisition radar vehicle and command post to cue 
and coordinate fire (Kopp, 2009-2012; 2009-2011; 2009-2012). 
 
 The survivability of cruise missiles is especially of interest in this context, 
as they are typically subsonic, fly mostly at low altitudes, are expensive compared 
to other PGMs, and must penetrate, often, hundreds of miles of contested or 
2
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss3/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1104
denied airspace. The survivability of cruise missiles enroute can be maximized by 
careful planning to remain out of the range of known fixed air defenses, and the 
most likely or most feasible deployment sites for mobile air defenses. The 
terminal phase of the flight, where the cruise missile approaches its intended 
Designated Mean Point of Impact, presents the greatest survivability challenge, as 
the vehicle will be within direct line-of-sight of any Counter PGM system 
deployed in very close proximity to the intended target. An additional challenge is 
that terminal flight trajectory algorithms intended to achieve a desired impact 
angle may further constrain the terminal trajectory shape, especially for a dive 
maneuver, where the vehicle must “pop up” to an apogee before it can perform a 
dive (Riedel et al, 2010). 
 
 While a number of strategies intended to maximize survivability in 
endgame trajectories are feasible, terrain masking intended to minimize exposure 
time to terminal defenses is especially of interest. This is because reaction times 
in Counter PGM systems are bounded by several constraints, including the 
angular sweep velocity of acquisition radars, turret slew times, missile gyroscope 
spin up times, tracking sensor slew, and acquisition times, and often the reaction 
times of human operators who must decide whether the acquired target merits 
engagement. Another factor is weapon fly out time, and minimum engagement 
range limitations in the defending system. The result of these constraints is that 
often the window in time where an engagement is feasible will be very short, and 
any routing strategy which minimizes the duration of this window must in turn 
maximize the survivability of the air vehicle. 
 
 The strategy explored in this study is that of minimizing the probability of 
air vehicle detection by GIS enhanced terrain masked midcourse routing and GIS 
enhanced terminal flight-path selection, the latter intended to minimize exposure 
time during the endgame through terrain masking. To simplify modeling, this 
study assumes a priori knowledge of the location of all air defense systems 
enroute and in close proximity to the target. While this cannot be assumed in 
practice, many modern cruise missile designs incorporate data links for mid-
course flight-path and aim-point updates, and carry internally stored GIS datasets 
to support navigation sensors such as TERCOM. This permits implementations 
where the location and type of air defenses enroute and near the target could be 
dynamically updated in flight, with the air vehicle’s Operational Flight Program 
dynamically recomputing optimal routes as updates are received. Where the 
guidance package does not employ TERCOM, the addition of Flash NVRAM to 
incorporate additional memory for a stored GIS dataset will not incur 
unreasonable weight or power penalties. A more expensive strategy would be to 
equip the air vehicle with an emitter locating system to dynamically identify and 
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geolocate any air defense systems which might paint the vehicle enroute, and 
exploit this information to dynamically alter the route to minimize further 
exposure, with commensurate weight, power and volumetric penalties. 
 
Literature Review 
  
Air Defense Systems 
 
 Russia has substantially improved over the air defense systems that were 
in use, and relatively easily penetrated by the US, during the First Gulf War. As of 
2014, there are two main systems in operational use that the US Air Force would 
have to contend with, the S-300 and S-400. The earlier system is known as the S-
300, shown in Figure 1, and the newer generation is known as the S-400 which 
you see depicted in Figure 2. Russia has the S-300 deployed in missile batteries 
throughout their country, and the S-400 is currently devoted to defending the 
airspace around the capital city of Moscow, which is regarded as the most 
effectively defended airspace in the world. Russians are extremely fearful about 
potentially hostile stealth aircraft penetrations. The concern is obvious given the 
devotion they have dedicated to technical development over the last several 
decades. The S-300 system is also in wide use by and available through purchase 
to China, and the rest of the world, including Iran. China will most likely acquire 
the S-400 system in the next few years. Any US aircraft or cruise missile trying to 
enter Russian or Chinese airspace will have to contend with detection and missile 
launch from these extremely capable systems.  
 
 Both the S-300 and S-400 equipment systems are organized into air 
defense batteries, each of which forms a part of a centrally controlled integrated 
air defense system, or IADS, of a region. Each battery consists of about 6-8 
vehicles. There is one early warning or acquisition radar vehicle, which may also 
be the headquarters vehicle for the battery, there is an engagement radar vehicle, 
and about four to six transporter / erector / launcher (TEL) vehicles, which each 
transports 4 surface-to-air missiles in tubes on the back of the vehicle. 
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Figure 1. S-300 System.  
 
 The acquisition radar constantly searches the sky out to several hundred 
miles around the battery location since the engagement radar can only observe a 
very narrow section of the sky by design. Once the acquisition radar locates a 
potential target and confirms it, it queues up the engagement radar which will get 
a precision location and heading to the target, at which time missiles can be 
launched and are guided most of the way to the target, at which time the missile’s 
internal seeker algorithms and sensors take over and perform terminal missile 
guidance to impact the target. The entire sequence between initial detection, 
missile launch, guidance, and impact can take 30 to 60 seconds. This is why when 
deployed to the field, IADS missile batteries are on a virtual hairpin triggers 
around-the-clock, as every second can make the difference regarding missing an 
incoming aircraft which would then be able to launch and deliver its weapons 
successfully. For the S-300 system, the acquisition radar is the 64N6 Big Bird 
shown in the upper left in Figure 1, in the upper right is the 30N6 Tombstone 
engagement radar, the truck in the lower left is the four missile round Transporter 
Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicle, shown with the missile tubes prepared for 
launch, and the 48N6 missile used is shown being launched in the lower right of 
Figure 1. It is strikingly apparent from the size of the missile that the explosive 
payload (145kg) is easily more than enough to bring down just about any aircraft: 
military, civilian, or commercial. 
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Figure 2. S-400 System. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 2 is the even more modern and capable S-400 
Triumf system. This system consists of the 96L6 Cheese Board acquisition radar 
shown in the upper left, the 92N2 Grave Stone engagement radar shown in the 
upper right, the 4 round transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle shown in the 
lower left, and the 48N6 surface-to-air missile shown in the lower right. The 
range of the 48N6 missile is about 250 miles, so 4 S-400 batteries could cover 
approximately 1,000 miles of air frontage. Longer-range missiles, such as the 
40M6, are also available. Typically, when launching a missile at a target, a single 
launch round will suffice, except for protocol adaptations such as in the case of a 
high-value B-2 bomber, in which situation two missiles may be launched to 
further increase the probability of successful hits. Since the 48N6 missile travels 
at Mach 12.0, it will cover 250 miles in about 98 seconds.  
 
 Russia has had focused development to improve these radars and missiles 
so that it is virtually impossible for older generations of aircraft, such as the F-14, 
F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 to successfully penetrate air spaces defended by the S-300 
and S-400 systems. It is widely regarded in defense circles, therefore, that these 
aircraft should be considered obsolete — they are not survivable in a modern 
venue. Only the F-22, B-2, to a lesser extent the F-35, and some of the cruise 
missiles such as the Tomahawk are the only strong choices capable of penetrating 
the airspace defended by these two systems. Any technological edge the US can 
procure to reduce the probability of detection (and thereby possible destruction) 
6
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss3/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1104
of their most capable aircraft by these air defense systems is sorely needed given 
the lack of new aircraft and missile development by the US. 
 
 The best outcome for a US penetrating aircraft or missile would be to 
simply avoid detection by any of these system’s radar while flying its mission. 
Leveraging stealth is now more important than ever in the second decade of the 
21st century, but as these air defense systems become more capable, that prospect 
is becoming much more elusive.  
 
 Russia has also developed an impressive portfolio of additional radar 
systems specifically designed to detect low-flying and stealth aircraft and cruise 
missiles which you can see some examples of listed below in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Operational Russian Radar Systems (source: www.ausairpower.net). 
 
 The list above makes evident the wide coverage spectrum coverage 
resulting from the various radars through the frequency bands of VHF, UHF, L-
band, S-band, X-band, Ku-band, K-band, and the Ka-band. Russia has plentiful 
designs in all frequency ranges, and large quantities of deployed systems. These 
together can be considered quite a daunting array of long- and medium-range 
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radar systems that an Air Force may be called upon to attempt to defeat with a 
very limited number of available and capable aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 4. Russian Point Defense Systems. 
 
 In addition to the long-range systems discussed, there are also systems 
designed for what is known as short range “point defense”. If any missile or 
aircraft gets through the longer-range S-300 or S-400 type systems, these point 
defense systems are optimized for extremely quick responses and shoots within a 
few seconds. They are also much more mobile than the longer-range systems, and 
move around frequently by design and doctrine.  
 
 Some of these point defenses depicted in Figure 4 include the Tor M2, Tor 
M1, Tungusca M, the LD-2000 in the lower left, Pantsir S2, and in the lower right 
the Almaz-Antey laser directed energy weapon development project. This is quite 
an array of additional air defense assets that the US may be called upon at some 
time to deal with, and it includes various long-range search and early warning 
radars, missile battery system such as the S-300 and S-400, the wide assortment 
of point defense weapons, and laser directed energy weapon systems under 
development.  
 
 At the same time as being defended by very capable IADS systems, many 
of the targets themselves will be protected in super-hardened underground 
shelters, such as in the case of the more than 45 PLAAF underground mountain 
bases, which in total comprise enough sheltering area to hold within them more 
than the entire 1,500 strong PLAAF aircraft fleet simultaneously. 
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 The most capable aircraft the US would have for the foreseeable future for 
likely deep-penetration missions include 16 B-2 bombers and 187 F-22 fighters. 
Since the available number of these aircraft will be not sufficient for a protracted 
campaign. One solution would be maximizing the effectiveness of available 
cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, a 1980s Cold War design. 
The numbers of these would likely be severely limited also, but a compensating 
prospect is that production could be ramped up on a much shorter than for aircraft 
production. Additionally, each missile costs a fraction of combat aircraft cost, 
usually on the order of 1/100th, or quite a bit less, than the cost of a single combat 
aircraft. The Tomahawk missile, according to the US Navy, costs $569,000 
(United States Navy). In comparison, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
reports the unit cost of F-35 to be $142.6 million (Sullivan, 2014). That is less 
than 1/200th of the aircraft cost. 
 
 As a result, our research presented in this paper focuses on potentially 
improving the penetration and survivability of the Tomahawk or other cruise 
missiles into the airspace defended by modern IADS systems. 
 
 In summary this is an extremely high-stakes game of air defense, and 
attack, as well as stealth, that nations in the global community have been working 
on to outclass each other in for a long time spending in total hundreds of billions 
of dollars. Unfortunately, the balance has tipped recently more towards the favor 
of non-US/NATO bloc aligned countries.  
 
Mission Route Planning 
 
 This section focuses closely on the technical aspects of how to accomplish 
the stated research goal, given the likely parameters that we have previously 
discussed regarding the penetration of a modern IADS. As previously mentioned, 
US forces are, with little doubt, constrained extensively by the small number of 
available and capable aircraft in future decades for these types of missions. Not 
only is this for possible actual missions, but also useful in attempting to maintain 
the deterrence effect of US military power. US forces should at least have the 
potential to run these missions successfully with little doubt in order to prevent 
unnecessary foreign aggression. 
 
 Computer science and artificial intelligence techniques can maximize the 
effectiveness of some of the available equipment, even if that equipment is less 
than ideal as previously mentioned. The goal here is to increase the efficiency of 
existing and available equipment with only small added financial costs while 
trying to maintain a short development time. Developing new aircraft typically 
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takes 1 to 2 decades, and recently, even longer. New development costs are not 
something that will be able to be shouldered within the federal budget again 
anytime soon, with limited exceptions. In other words, hardware that is currently 
in the arsenal may very well be all that is available on short notice, and leveraging 
it effectively should be a high priority for the US military. 
 
 One alternative to using long-range penetrating aircraft is precision guided 
munitions, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile. One attractive aspect of using a 
design such as the Tomahawk is that it is able to be mass-produced and 
production could be ramped up theoretically in several months. Also, the price tag 
is significantly lower than any of the aircraft at only $1.5 million, so it is the 
equivalent of 1/100th of an F-22 or 1/500th of a B-2 bomber. The Tomahawk 
entered service in 1983. It is not stealthy by design, nor is it supersonic, like the 
newer generation Russian and Chinese cruise missiles. As a result, it has some 
significant limitations, such as that the slow speed which makes it particularly 
vulnerable to point defenses, many of which we mentioned earlier. These can 
catch a slow moving cruise missile, hugging the ground at treetop heights, in its 
final few seconds before it will impact its target. The point defenses will be 
grouped right around the general area of the target specifically scanning the 
horizon for incoming cruise missiles. 
 
 The research problem posed more specifically therefore is how do we 
enhance the survivability and effectiveness of the Tomahawk cruise missile by 
using computer science techniques? Figure 5 shows more details on the 
Tomahawk BGM-109, also known as the TLAM. 
 
The TLAM uses a GPS system for navigation and guidance, it is 18 feet 
long, has a wingspan of 8 feet, and weighs 2,700 pounds. It has a range of 700 to 
1000 miles, and flies at a speed of 550 mph. It has a 1,000-pound conventional 
warhead. These missiles can be launched from submarines, cruisers, destroyers, 
and even the ground. The missile is designed to fly above the terrain at an altitude 
as low as 50 feet using stored elevation maps and the onboard radar and GPS. An 
onboard camera compares the actual target to a stored image as it zeroes in on the 
final approach. One way to avoid radar detection is to fly at ground level, such as 
the TLAM does, since a radar will be blinded to any objects behind blocking 
terrain obstacles or topography. So the general approach is to find a path that 
minimizes the risk to the TLAM through the air defense system, utilizing and 
taking advantage of some computer science and artificial intelligence techniques 
known as traversal algorithms. 
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Figure 5. Tomahawk BGM-109 Cruise Missile. 
 
 In computer science, graph traversal is the problem of visiting all the 
nodes in a graph in a particular manner updating and/or checking their values 
along the way. Tree traversal is a special case of graph traversal. In our case our 
terrain map around the target is our graph, and we want to traverse this graph in a 
manner so as to reduce radar detectability of the TLAM from different radar sites 
that are located on the map. 
 
S-400 and Pantsir Specific Performance and Constraint Modeling 
 
 Practical mission planning experience in given terrain situations dictates 
there is simply no way to avoid radar detection, especially in areas up close and 
near to well defended targets. Opportunities for terrain masking may be 
nonexistent. However, the pathfinding algorithm can exploit time delays and 
equipment limitations of the various systems if these costs are modeled and 
specifically defined for the algorithm computation. This prospect could be seen as 
analogous to the Cowboy Western movie situation where the gunfighters hide 
behind a rock and dash to another location before the opponent can muster their 
aim well enough to fire with any accuracy. If an enroute TLAM cruise missile can 
find another obstacle to hide behind before the SAM shot can be gotten off 
successfully, even though in this case the missile did not avoid detection, it will 
still be survivable.  
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 Shown below in Figure 6 are the distilled out relevant timing and 
equipment performance constraints for the S-400 that the system must conform to 
in order to engage targets successfully. For example, before a missile can be 
launched, a sequence of complex events has to occur, each taking at least a 
minimum amount of time. The early warning radar has to spot the missile and 
hand it off to the separate engagement radar, each of these requires additionally at 
least two sweeps of radar to adequately track a TLAM or other cruise missile. 
Handoff from one radar to the other takes a few seconds, as well as staff 
evaluation and decision as to whether the target is legitimate and worthy to be 
fired upon. If the IADS sector had been previously quiet, the missile gyros may 
not have been previously started, and it takes approximately 10 seconds for the 
SAM missile gyros to spin up before a missile can be launched.  
 
 Altogether for the S-400 system, our analysis shows it would take between 
54 and 151 seconds for the battery to successfully impact a target with a missile. 
Detection and tracking could be lost at any time during the sequence, at which 
time the TLAM missile would have to be reacquired and the sequence started 
from scratch. By having the movement pathfinding algorithm account for these 
time delays, and assign much higher cost multipliers for movements later in any 
potential engagement sequence, movements with high risks of shoot-down can be 
avoided relative to the trade-offs available on different routes. 
 
 The sequences, depicted in Figure 6, include: possible early warning 
detection, which is best case for the missile battery to be ready with missile gyros 
spun up, a missile battery tracking activity and launch decision, and the missile 
launch and fly out activities, which also require time and continuous consecutive 
tracking for most of the missile flight time. During the last few seconds of SAM 
missile flight, the missile’s internal guidance and navigation system takes over to 
impact the target with no additional tracking guidance provided by the battery. 
However, even at this time, a clear line-of-sight must be maintained between the 
SAM and the TLAM until impact. These sequences are encoded into the 
calculations of our mission planning model algorithms. 
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Figure 6. S-400 System Engagement and Launch Process (notes in [ ] brackets 
below). 
 
 S-400 acquisition, tracking, engagement, and launch sequence checkpoints 
and description notes from Figure 6: 
 
1. A minimum of two radar sweeps is required to detect and acquire a target. 
2. "Detectable" is defined as the radar cross section aspect shown of the 
target having a probability of detection greater than 90% for given radar 
equipment performance specifications. "LOS" is defined as a clear 
straight-line path ("line-of-sight") existing between the radar and the target 
containing no terrain or other obstructions. 
3. For radar sweeps, preliminary value is 180-degree average sweep/slew 
distance to be covered before first target return (90 degrees in case of 
91N6 as it is dual-faced). 
4. This is the loss of consecutive target track time that makes it necessary for 
the sequence be started from scratch at Entry Point 1 or 2 in order to 
reacquire a target. 
5. The danger-escalation cell movement cost "penalty" multiplier for the A* 
Algorithm that is used for potential movement evaluation during each 
status indicated. 
6. Early detection may take place if the TLAM is observable within range 
and LOS of any system early detection radar. 
7. The TLAM will remain undetected by flying behind terrain masking 
and/or remaining out of detectable radar range. 
8. In this case: A. Brigade command post notified. + B. All IADS assets put 
on sector alert. + C. All system missile gyros are spun up. 
9. This phase involves delay for human interpretation and decision. 
10. 91N6 Big Bird and 96L6 BAR detection should be concurrent at this point 
for most efficient handover. 
13
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11. 96L6 BAR can autonomously acquire targets with 2 radar sweeps of a 
detectable object. 
12. Half this value (7.25 seconds) is used if Early Warning exists. 
13. With Sequence Entry Point 2, cumulative time value at Handover (29.5 
Seconds) can be subtracted. 
14. For autonomous battery acquisition, missile gyro spin up will occur at this 
time. 
15. 96L6 BAR and 92N6E Tombstone detection should be concurrent until 
launch decision is complete. 
16. 3 second average initial slew is removed if Early Warning exists. 
17. Possible existence of an S-400 "full automatic" mode may preclude any 
battery decision delays if it is activated. 
18. 10-30 seconds if no Early Warning and/or missile gyro spin up is 
necessary. 
19. Necessary if no Early Warning--may or may not be on critical time path 
for missile launch 
20. The 48N6E3 missile guidance control algorithm uses a modified p-Nav 
approach where missile aims for projected target location at time of 
impact. 
21. Only 92N6E Tombstone tracking is necessary during missile fly out, 
however a 2 second detection loss will result in errant missiles that do not 
impact the target. 
22. This includes 5%-time penalty for missile control maneuvering delays and 
non-direct flight. 7.5 seconds is subtracted for average Endgame phase 
length. 
23. No radar tracking is necessary during final 7.5 seconds of missile endgame 
for selectable missile types. 
24. Loss of target to radar track during missile endgame is not relevant--
missile relies at this point on internal TVM/SAGG guidance. LOS to 
missile location is evaluated instead in Endgame. 
25. Salvos of 2 missiles are normally fired, making the probability of missile 
misses insignificant for a slow-moving TLAM type target. 
26. TLAM destruction with probability of 100% if prior conditions are 
achieved. 
 As a specific example of one of the many constraints we have discussed 
for tracking and firing of SAM missiles, Figure 7 shows the multiple sweep radar 
tracking problem. The radar will need multiple sweeps to get a reliable detection, 
and many sweeps to effect track and cue for engagement, for the fire control radar 
to effect a missile shot. The beam sweep time is determined by the number of 
revolutions per minute of the radar equipment which is fixed based on the motor 
rotational speed turning the radar antenna and cannot be changed. 
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Figure 7. The Multiple Sweep Radar Tracking Problem. 
 
 Similar to the breakdown for the S-400 system, the table in Figure 8 below 
shows the constraints and time delays for the Pantsir point defense system. It is 
calculated that this system would take between 47 and 98 seconds from the time 
of first detection to missile impact, with a most likely case of about 64 seconds.  
 
 
Figure 8. Pantsir System Engagement and Launch Process (notes in [ ] brackets 
below). 
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  Pantsir acquisition, tracking, engagement, and launch sequence 
checkpoints and description notes from Figure 8: 
 
1. A minimum of two radar sweeps is required to detect and acquire a target. 
2. "Detectable" is defined as the radar cross section aspect shown of the 
target having a probability of detection greater than 90% for given radar 
equipment performance specifications. "LOS" is defined as a clear 
straight-line path ("line-of-sight") existing between the radar and the target 
containing no terrain or other obstructions. 
3. For radar sweeps, preliminary value is 180-degree average sweep/slew 
distance to be covered before first target return (90 degrees in the case of 
91N6 as it is dual-faced). 
4. This is the loss of consecutive target track time that makes it necessary for 
the sequence be started from scratch at Entry Point 1 or 3 in order to 
reacquire a target. 
5. A danger-escalation cell movement cost "penalty" multiplier for the A* 
Algorithm. Used for potential movement evaluation during each status 
indicated. 
6. Early detection may take place if the TLAM is observable within range 
and LOS of any system early detection radar. 
7. TLAM will remain undetected by flying behind terrain masking and/or 
remaining out of detectable radar range. 
8. At this point: A. Brigade command post notified. + B. All IADS assets put 
on sector alert. 
9. This phase involves delay for human interpretation and decision. 
10. 91N6 Big Bird and 2RL80E detection does not need to be concurrent after 
this point for handover to occur. 
11. 2RL80E can autonomously acquire targets with 2 radar sweeps of a 
detectable object. 
12. Half this value (3.75 seconds) is used if Early Warning exists. 
13. With Sequence Entry Point 3, cumulative time value at Handover (29.5 
Seconds) can be subtracted. 
14. For autonomous battery acquisition, missiles are readied at this time. 
15. 2RL80E and 1RS2-1 detection does not need to be concurrent after this 
point. 
16. 1.5 second average initial slew is removed if Early Warning exists. 
17. Possible existence of a Pantsir S1 "full automatic" mode may preclude any 
battery decision delays if it is activated. 
18. 1-5 seconds if no Early Warning is necessary. 
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19. The 57E6 missile guidance will aim for projected target location at time of 
impact. 
20. Only 1RS2-1 Phazotron tracking is necessary during missile fly out, 
however a 2 second tracking loss will result in errant missiles that do not 
impact the target. 
21. Includes a 0%-time penalty for missile control maneuvering delays and 
non-direct flight. 3 seconds is subtracted for average Endgame phase 
length. 
22. Radar tracking continues to be necessary during final 3 seconds of missile 
endgame. 
23. Salvos of 2 missiles are normally fired, making the probability of missile 
misses insignificant for a slow-moving TLAM type target. 
24. TLAM destruction with probability of 100% if previous conditions are 
achieved. 
25. At maximum range (4km), 30mm gun fire will take approximately 4 
seconds to close the distance to the target at 980m/s. Target must remain 
in sight during this entire period. 
26. TLAM destruction with probability of 100%. 
 
Results 
 
 Figure 9, below, shows two sample completed mission routes. The start 
location is in the lower left and the goal location is in the center of the map. Four-
point defense systems are shown at the centers of the red range circles. There also 
two longer range S-400 radars in the upper right and lower right of the terrain 
area. These paths give a good idea of the sensitivity of the path to very small 
changes. The path on the left is 29 km long, and has 12 seconds during which 
time the incoming TLAM missile would be detected. The path on the right is also 
29 km in length but has reduced the time of detectability down to one second. 
Each of these paths are flying within a few hundred meters of the other, but that 
small difference is enough to shield the missile using the terrain features from 
virtually assured destruction. 
 
The locations of the SAM batteries and radars may not be known before a 
mission. The mission route planners would in this case be compiling information 
using an accumulated dossier of satellite reconnaissance, aircraft reconnaissance, 
human intelligence, and signal intelligence by picking up the radar emissions 
from the various sites and triangulating them. Unfortunately, defending air 
defense vehicles will be moving around often as part of their doctrine. As a result, 
the intelligence of radar deployments will be limited at best, mission flight paths 
may be necessarily re-planned in-flight to account for new information. The entire 
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intelligence picture will not be known on most occasions. Routes can be 
recalculated in progress using newly derived information. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Pathfinding Results for Simulated Mission. 
 
 Figure 10 shows another example of a mission on 100 km wide map 
defended by both an S-400 battery and Pantsir point defense systems. A 55 km 
flight at 30 m above ground level, or 90 feet above the terrain, takes 3.74 minutes 
and only the final three seconds are detectable. This is a good result because the 
missile would not be able to be shot down in those final three seconds according 
to the Pantsir point defense timing limitations. The main terrain feature the path is 
able to exploit are the hills to the east of the target airfield, the missile can fly on 
the far side of the hills from south to north, and only make its final approach and 
become exposed to the point defense systems in the final three seconds. The 
missile flies low enough also to be over the curvature of the earth from longer 
range S-400 observation, despite the fact that the S-400 Big Bird and Tombstone 
acquisition radars are on elevating platforms which extends their over-the-horizon 
line of sight range. 
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Figure 10. Simulated Airfield Mission Route Results.  
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